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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1952 MAY 23 PM 12 49

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
S/P

May 22, 1952

EUR/MEC

To: S/P - Mr. Nitze

From: EUR - Mr. Bonbright

Subject: S/P Paper Concerning Defense Security in the Middle East.

Thank you very much for sending us copies of the S/P paper pertaining to defense security in the Middle East. We understand that these will be used by Mr. Matthews as the basis for discussion with the JCS on May 28.

The memoranda, both the original and the revised version which includes Colonel Dunn's suggestions, look very good to us and should afford an excellent foundation for Mr. Matthews' discussion with the JCS. We in EUR believe that a very useful purpose will be served by this consideration of the Middle East military defense problem on its merits rather than in terms of the "political" objectives contemplated in recent Departmental thinking in regard to the MEC.

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 6/28/78
PER VELIOTES OFFICE WEA
720115

See Raynor memo attached

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
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~~PM~~ (R)

EUR/MEC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1952 MAY 23 AM 11 20

May 22, 1952.

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

To: P S/P - Mr. Nitze
Mr. Ferguson

From: BNA - Mr. Raynor

Subject: S/P Paper Concerning Defense Security in the Middle East.

Andy Foster tells me that he mentioned to you this morning my concern over the point that our thesis regarding defense security in the Middle East should include the element that we should strengthen the position of the U.K. in the region so that it can do a more effective job.

Andy told me that you had this point very much in mind, that it was implicit in your paper, and that it would be dealt with orally by Mr. Matthews at his meeting with the JCS on May 28.

The purpose of this memorandum is merely to reiterate my concern over the point and to express the hope that it will be borne in mind.

DECLASSIFICATION DATE 6/28/78
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EUR:BNA:HRaynor:snm

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING STAFF

206 (R) HEM FEM

May 21, 1952

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
10:30
MAY 23 1952
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM

To: G - Mr. Matthews
C - Mr. Bohlen
NEA - Mr. Berry
EUR - Mr. Bonbright

From: S/P - Philip H. Watts PHW

"Deliver Secretary in Middle East." 5/21

See S/P record copy for previous drafts.

For your information, there is attached a revised version of the S/P paper sent to you under cover of a memorandum of May 20 from Mr. Nitze. Colonel Dunn of the JCS has recommended minor changes in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 on page 2, which Mr. Nitze has accepted and incorporated herein.

This draft will be used as the basis for discussion with the JCS on ~~May 28~~ June 11 or Discussed 6/18/52

HEM - There is still much of U.N. action in the Far East Command as a means of [illegible] objectives in Korea. I think it is important [illegible]. PHW

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May 21, 1952

Problem

To consider what measures might be taken to bring about an improved prospect for defense security in the Middle East between now and 1955.

Discussion

Even though the strength being created under NATO may be inadequate as against the requirements, strength is being built, and when coupled with our NATO commitments now extended to Greece and Turkey and the steps being taken to link Yugoslavia with Western defense, they offer a considerable deterrent to aggression in that theater.

In the Far East, our intervention in Korea has brought at least a temporary check to the progress of aggression in that area. The requirements for increasing Japanese strength, improving the capabilities on Formosa, and of stabilizing and then improving the situation in Southeast Asia can be roughly foreseen, although they may be extremely difficult of realization.

In the

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In the Middle East, however, the general picture appears to be one of such continuing weakness as to constitute an invitation to a shift in the theatre of primary pressure if further Communist progress were to be successfully blocked in other areas.

The defense of the Middle East is primarily a U.K. responsibility. As we understand it, however, capabilities available to the British are wholly inadequate to defend the Middle East against Soviet aggression and it appears doubtful that they are adequate to provide the minimum requirements for even the shortest line of defense east of the Suez Canal.

The only indigenous forces in the area, aside from the Turks, which appear to have any useful capability at present are the Arab Legion and the Israeli, and these are apparently of very limited utility. Such strength as is at present assured to the U.K. from the Dominions is not only too little but would probably arrive too late.

Without suggesting any derogation of U.K. responsibility for the defense of the area, it would appear that the U.S. will have to provide more assistance and

bring

bring its influence to bear if we are to look forward to a significant strengthening of the situation in the Middle East.

Our influence and assistance might take several possible forms:

(a) In connection with our obligations to provide for the security of Australia and New Zealand, influence with these two Dominions so that they will create forces and make them available in time of peace, or sufficiently promptly after the outbreak of war to be effective;

(b) Influence with the Union of South Africa so that they will provide more substantial forces than they are at present willing to assign to the Middle East, and emphasis on the importance to their own security of successfully defending in the Middle East;

(c) Influence with the Turks, coupled with supply assistance as practicable to increase Turkey's capability of contributing to the defense of the area outside of Turkey;

(d) Influence with Pakistan, coupled with supply assistance as practicable to increase Pakistan's capability of contributing to the defense of the Middle

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Middle East, and continued efforts to secure a settlement in Kashmir to this end;

(e) Influence with the Arab States, Israel and Iran, coupled with supply assistance as practicable, to:

1. Increase the effectiveness of Egyptian forces for the maintenance and defense of the Suez bases, in the event of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement;

2. Improve the effectiveness of the Israeli forces, and increase their size as Arab forces are increased;

3. Develop additional forces comparable to the Arab Legion where that is feasible, and in any case plan with the Arab States for effective guerrilla resistance;

4. Continue military assistance to Iran, and, in the event of improved political conditions there, seek the creation of forces capable of undertaking defense as well as security tasks.

(f) Assistance either to the U.K. or directly in meeting the air deficiency which now appears to exist.

We would

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We would appreciate having the views of the JCS as to (1) the relative importance and time phasing from their viewpoint of strengthening the Middle Eastern defense situation; (2) the relative importance from the military viewpoint of the objectives for which we might use our influence and assistance as outlined above; (3) the degree to which the use of atomic weapons against the mountain passes into the area would permit the defense of substantial portions of the Middle East even under present conditions.